Five theses on the situation in Nepal

VIJAY PRASHAD AND ATUL CHANDRA

Following the resignation of Nepalese Prime Minister K.P. Oli amid massive protests driven by the country's youth, various narratives have circulated that simplify and distort the complexities and realities on the ground in Nepal that are at the root of this crisis.

If your house is not clean, ants will enter through the door and attract snakes.

The crisis in Nepal worsened in early September, overthrowing the center-right government of Prime Minister K.P. Oli (From the Communist Party). The immediate trigger was the regulation and banning of social media on September 4. Protests against this measure were suppressed by police gunfire, leaving 19 demonstrators dead. The protests escalated, turning into mass demonstrations and attacks on politicians' homes, the national parliament building, and the presidential residence.

There are several narratives circulating about the current unrest, but two predominate:

  1. Systemic failure of governance: Years of broken promises, corruption, and opportunistic alliances have led to a crisis of legitimacy not of this or that party, but of the establishment. The current upswing is explained as a popular reaction to accumulated neglect.
  2. Thesis of the color revolution: that the protests are orchestrated by an external force, with most fingers pointing to the United States and the US Congress' funding through the National Endowment for Democracy to Hami Nepal (established in 2015).

Both theories allow the parties involved in Nepal to easily evade responsibility, either by blaming it on foreign interference or a vague notion of the "political class." These theories fail to address the underlying bourgeois order and its problems in Nepal: a patronage economy that is more than a century old, control of land, finance, and government contracts by an oligopoly closely tied to the monarchy, and a growth paradigm that depends on the export of migrant workers and debt-financed infrastructure development. The structural causes of the population's grievances are simplified into simplistic but evocative concepts, such as "corruption" and "color revolution."

None of these theories is entirely wrong or right; they are only partial, and their bias can be very misleading. This article does not aim to correct that bias per se, but hopes to offer some ideas for debate. The five theses presented below are intended only to frame the debate, which we hope will be not only about Nepal's plight, but also about that of many countries in the Global South.

1. Poor management of the moment of opportunity. After Nepal's new Constitution was promulgated in 2015, there was great hope that the broad left could improve the social situation of Nepalis. Thus, in 2017, the various communist parties won 75% of the seats in the national Parliament.

The following year, the largest communist parties united to form the Communist Party of Nepal, although the unity was shallow because the parties had their own structures and programs and could not truly form a unified party, but primarily a unified electoral bloc. The lack of a common program for communist political activity and a common agenda for solving people's problems through the instrument of the state led to the dissipation of the opportunity that had been provided to the left.

The unified party split in 2021, and since then, various left-wing parties have alternated in power, which the public has viewed as individualistic and opportunistic practices. When Home Minister Narayan Kaji Shrestha (2023-2024), of the Maoist Centre, attempted to use state instruments to investigate corrupt practices, including within his own party, he was expelled from office.

Since 2024, the Nepalese government has included a right-wing faction on the left (led by KP Oli) and a right-wing faction (the Nepali Congress), making it a center-right government. The long struggle for democracy that began with the 1951 Revolution, intensified with the Jana Andolan (People's Movement) of 1990, and then seemed to consolidate with the Loktantra Andolan (Movement for Democracy) of 2006, only to appear to have been defeated, when in reality that long struggle is reappearing in other forms.

2. Inability to address the basic problems of the population. Nepal's problems in 2015, when the new Constitution was adopted, were severe. A massive earthquake in Gorkha devastated the province, leaving more than 10.000 dead and hundreds of thousands homeless. At least a quarter of Nepalis lived below the poverty line. Discrimination based on caste and ethnicity created a deep sense of hopelessness. Madhesh province, located on the Nepal-India border, was particularly incensed by the sense of disadvantage and the analysis that the 2015 Constitution further marginalized it. Weak public healthcare and education, which had not been adequately funded for a century, could not meet the aspirations of the emerging middle class.

Left-wing governments have proposed various policies to address some of these issues, lifting large segments of the population out of poverty (child poverty fell from 36% in 2015 to 15% in 2025) and infrastructure decay (access to electricity is now 99%, and there has been an improvement in the Human Development Index).

However, a huge gap remains between expectations and reality, as inequality rates do not decrease sufficiently and migration remains at alarmingly high levels. Corruption levels also remained too high in the country, as perceptions of corruption deteriorated (ranking 107 out of 180 in 2024). The government has failed to contain corruption, inequality, and inflation, and has concluded highly unfavorable trade and financial agreements with the IMF (the return to the IMF's Extended Credit Facility has reduced its tax possibilities).

3. The tendency to seek refuge in the idea of ​​the Hindu monarchy. The Nepalese petite bourgeoisie, who send their children to English-language schools and often come from oppressed or "backward" Hindu castes, is frustrated by the continued dominance of the upper castes and is inspired by the politics of the right-wing Hindutva petite bourgeoisie of Uttar Pradesh, one of the states bordering Nepal. Therefore, the marches featured many posters featuring Yogi Adityanath, leader of India's right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and head of the Uttar Pradesh government. This segment of the population is also ready to "return" to the monarchy, which is a Hindu monarchy. Several political forces support these trends, for example, the pro-monarchy party (Rashtriya Prajatantra Party or RPP) and its allies (Joint Committee of People's Movement, formed in March 2025 as part of the protests for the return to the monarchy, Shiv Sena Nepal, Vishwa Hindu Mahasabha).

Since the 1990s, the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (HSS), the international affiliate of the Indian RSS, has quietly created shakhas (groups) and cadres. The HSS, along with a sprawling group of organizations, for example, the Shiv Sena and the RPP, has campaigned against secular policies and for a return to the Hindu Raj. Rather than simply attacking secularism, the Hindutva bloc has focused its attention on what it calls a revolving door of elites in Kathmandu that has held power since the monarchy was abolished in 2008. They frame their civilizing rhetoric around anti-corruption and charity, with mobilizations through Hindu festivals and online influencers, as well as selective outreach to marginalized and oppressed castes in the name of Hindu unity. This bloc, powerfully organized unlike the youth, has the capacity to seize power and restore order in the name of the Indian state and the monarchy, restoring authoritarianism in the name of fighting corruption.

4. Tired of the escape valve of migration. If we exclude smaller countries, such as Montserrat and Saint Kitts and Nevis, Nepal has the highest per capita rate of labor migration. With a population of 31 million, there are currently 534 registered Nepalis working abroad, or 500 people per 17,2 Nepalis. These numbers have increased significantly in recent years. In 1000, the registered number of Nepalis obtaining work permits abroad was 2000; now it is ten times higher. A new record was reached in 55-000, with 2022 permits issued.

Many young people are angry at not having been able to meet their employment needs within Nepal, but instead being forced to migrate and often accept horrible jobs. In February 2025, a terrible incident occurred in Yeongam (South Korea), when a 28-year-old migrant, Tulsi Pun Magar, likely committed suicide because the employer of the pig farm where she worked kept lowering her wages. Tulsi came from the Gurkha community in Pokhara. After her suicide, it was learned that 85 Nepalis had died in South Korea in the past five years, half of them by suicide. News like this increased frustration and anger toward the government. Online, many shared the view that the government cared more about foreign direct investors than its own migrants, whose investment in Nepal through remittances far outweighs any foreign capital.

5. The external influences of the United States and India. The center-right government of KP Oli had maintained a close relationship with the United States. Nepal had joined the U.S. government's Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in February 2017, a decision made by a left-wing government that was highly controversial among much of the left. Due to pressure from below, the Nepalese government stayed out of the MCC, but Oli's center-right government hosted John Wingle (MCC deputy vice-chairman) in Kathmandu in August 2025 for talks on resuming US aid and discussing the continuation of infrastructure projects. Meanwhile, Narendra Modi's far-right government in India sought to promote the role of the far-right Hindu nationalist party in Nepal, which had so far been on the sidelines. If there was any external activity in the 2025 protests, it is more likely that India, rather than the United States, had a hand in the events. However, even in this case, it is possible that the Nepalese far right is simply taking advantage of the collapse of the Oli government and the massive anti-corruption sentiment.

It is important to recognize that no RPP homes or offices were attacked, while in March RPP cadres attacked a communist office, which foreshadowed what happened now in September.

The army seems to have restored a measure of calm to Nepal. But it is a calm that is synonymous with disorder and danger. It remains to be seen what will happen next. It will take time for the situation to calm down. Will the army invite one of the internet celebrities to take power, for example, the mayor of Kathmandu, Balendra Shah? The protesters have suggested Sushila Karki, a highly respected former Chief Justice of Nepal (2016-2017), who has built her career by staying away from party politics. These are stopgap options. They will not have the mandate to make significant changes. They will pretend to be above politics, but that will only disillusion people with democracy and plunge the country into a long-term crisis. A new prime minister will not solve Nepal's problems.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian and journalist. Director of the Social Research Institute tricontinental. He has written more than 20 books. The last one in collaboration with Noam Chomsky: "The retreat. Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan and the fragility of US power., reviewed by David Bollero at Globalter.
Atul Chandra He is the coordinator of the Asia program at Tricontinental.
This article is published in collaboration with People's Dispatch

 

Leave your comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked with *