The Belt and Road Initiative diversifies the paths of cooperation with CELAC
Juan Enrique Serrano Moreno
This year, which marks the tenth anniversary of the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Forum, is an opportune moment to reflect on a decade of growing cooperation between China and Latin America and the Caribbean under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Over the past ten years, 24 of the 33 CELAC member states have joined the BRI, reaffirming their willingness to work with China to improve infrastructure connectivity and promote trade and investment.
The initiative has opened a new avenue for governments in the region to diversify their international partnerships in a context increasingly defined by geopolitical competition.
While the BRI has produced modest results in infrastructure development in Latin America and the Caribbean, especially compared to the achievements in building economic corridors between China and Southeast Asia or Europe, the strategic importance of China-CELAC cooperation should not be underestimated.
The most emblematic infrastructure project linked to the initiative in Latin America is the Chancay port megaproject in Peru. Developed by China Ocean Shipping Company, Chancay is expected to become the first deepwater port on the west coast of South America capable of receiving Neo-Panamax vessels, reducing maritime transit time between South America and China by approximately 10 days, improving regional connectivity, and positioning Peru as a logistics hub for the Southern Cone.
Other infrastructure projects led by Chinese companies also illustrate the depth of China-CELAC cooperation. In 2020, the State Grid Corporation of China (State Grid) acquired 96 percent of the shares of Compañía General de Electricidad (CGE), Chile's largest electricity distributor, for more than $3.000 billion, constituting one of the largest Chinese investments in the country. Despite external pressure and calls to subject the investment to political scrutiny on national security grounds, Chile's competition authority approved the transaction.
In the urban transport sector, the China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) was awarded the contract in 2021 to build the first section of Line 7 of the Santiago Metro, which comprises 7,9 kilometers, including 6,6 km of tunnels built using shield technology, an unprecedented technological innovation in Chile.
Among other contracts, the one signed by China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) in 2015, for a total of $44 million, includes the expansion of the San Antonio port terminal in Valparaíso, including the dredging of more than 320.000 cubic meters to increase loading capacity.
These projects demonstrate that Chinese companies are not only investing in resource extraction, but are also contributing to the development of critical infrastructure networks, positioning themselves as long-term partners in Latin America's economic transformation.
That said, the full potential of infrastructure cooperation under the BRI remains to be realized. The promise of large-scale investments has yet to translate into an effective transformation of the physical connectivity of the region's countries, due not only to global factors but also to internal challenges. In Latin America, complex approval processes, fragmented planning, and limited public sector capacities hamper project implementation.
Chinese investors have understood that, beyond political goodwill, the success of these projects depends largely on the administrative resilience of the host country.
Looking ahead, the BRI could reorient itself from physical infrastructure to a more integrated cooperation model that embraces the ecological transition. China's commitment to ecological civilization and its global leadership in renewable energy technologies have opened a new era in cooperation with Latin America.
Countries like Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru have reserves of critical minerals like lithium and copper, key inputs for the global energy transition, while Chinese companies have established themselves as world leaders in electric vehicles, solar panels, and battery storage capacity.
This complementarity can create the right conditions for deepening partnerships focused on green industrial development. For example, Chinese foreign direct investment in Indonesia's nickel industry has not been limited to extraction but has included processing facilities and technology transfer, strengthening domestic value chains. Similar models could be adapted to Latin American economies to foster green industrial clusters linked to infrastructure and transportation networks.
In Chile, the National Lithium Strategy, announced in 2023, has explicitly linked foreign investment to technology transfer and ecosystem protection. Companies like Tianqi, already present in the country, are well positioned to support this strategy, and the Chinese development model, with its emphasis on public-private cooperation, can inspire Latin American governments to link economic development with environmental sustainability.
Furthermore, institutional frameworks such as the China-CELAC Forum and bilateral free trade agreements must be updated to reflect these new priorities. Future cooperation agreements should include environmental clauses, joint innovation funds, and industrial upgrading mechanisms. These instruments will enable BRI-linked investments to contribute not only to connectivity but also to the achievement of long-term development goals.
In other words, China-CELAC cooperation over the past decade has laid the groundwork for a more strategic engagement. The next stage should focus on strengthening institutional, ecological, and productive resilience. The opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation are broad and range from ports and railways to green hydrogen and battery value chains.
During the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum, held on May 13, 2025, in Beijing, Latin American governments articulated a new vision for engagement with China. The future of the BRI in the region will depend not only on Chinese financing and technical expertise, but also on the capacity of Latin American countries to design inclusive development strategies and build effective institutional frameworks. The challenge now is to move from diplomatic declarations to transformative action, and turn the partnership into shared prosperity.
