Local elections in Taiwan: some results that can be extrapolated?

XULIO RIOS

The political map resulting from the local elections held in Taiwan predicts a "long year" of 14 months until the presidential elections of 2024. As happened four years ago, the KMT leaves with good feelings; and as then, to consummate the long-awaited "double" he will need to tread very thinly in the coming months if he does not want to destroy this victory.

As is customary in this type of election, municipal and regional factors -more than general ones- weigh heavily, although other types of considerations also play a role, to varying degrees. There is no shortage, for example, of those who take advantage of them to encourage a vote of punishment for the governing formation as a warning to reorient their management.

In the case of Taiwan, the long shadow of China also weighs on the electorate's decision, especially in a situation like the current one, after six years of gradual increase in tension in the Strait.

Indeed, the data from local elections to the presidential elections, which must be held in January 2024, cannot be extrapolated in a linear and automatic way. But the victory of the KMT undoubtedly reveals the existence of an important social base that recognizes the strong roots on the island of the blue formation, de facto denying the criticism that it is a “foreign” formation (alluding to its transfer from the continent in 1949). Despite its crises, the KMT is still there and also with significant capacities to compete for the favor of the electorate.

On this occasion, some KMT candidates did not take refuge in their local joker or hide their heads when proposing a dialogue with Beijing to prevent a hypothetical war. And cases of espionage (such as that of Colonel Hsiang Teh-en) or electoral corruption (raids under the protection of the anti-infiltration law) in which China emerged as the instigator and enemy to be taken into account, opportunely slipped onto the media agenda. when casting the vote.

The PDP has done its best to link local elections with the hostility that characterizes its policy towards the mainland. The KMT has not entirely shied away from the debate, despite its usual awkwardness.

For the PDP, the electoral strategy is simple: China is the main threat to Taiwan, the KMT is China's main friend on the island, then the KMT is a threat to Taiwanese democracy. But if the threat is exaggerated or the hypothesis of a war becomes more plausible, the KMT emerges as the only force capable of avoiding it, guaranteeing dialogue and stability. And that connection, which up to now has worked like a charm for the PDP, could have its days numbered if it becomes synonymous with escalation towards war. The result in the referendum is not good news for the PDP, which always trusts the youngest as an opportune electoral nursery.

Local elections provide a big boost to the KMT by giving it more municipal and regional power, but it is a limited barometer and one that must factor new and old data into the equation. For example, the good result of the Taiwan People's Party could encourage Ko Wen-je's presidential candidacy (which could perhaps benefit the PDP more), or, in another order, the setback of the New Power Party. The third forces have reaped mixed results but the bipartisanship is still touched.

Tsai Ing-wen's resignation is déjà vu. He did the same in 2018. His resignation does not cause uncertainty or a vacuum in the PDP. Tsai cannot run in 2024. Regardless of who takes over from him in the party, everything indicates that the one chosen by then may be his vice president Lai Ching-te, a figure who for mainland China is even less acceptable than Tsai.

Beijing is interested in refloating the 1992 Consensus agreed with the KMT and vindicated in the middle of the electoral campaign by former president Ma Ying-jeou, but it also has to do its math and calculate its steps well, knowing that its options have a significant impact. in the Taiwanese electorate. The dilemma about the level of pressure, which will continue, is the key. If in Beijing they believe that the threat of war tilts the electorate towards the KMT, they will not hesitate to activate it. In the reversal of the 2018 results and Tsai's triumph in 2020, the Hong Kong crisis undoubtedly weighed.

If the year 2023 proves tumultuous and unstable in mainland China, the PDP may have another chance. The US reaction also matters in this equation. At the Biden-Xi meeting, much was said about Taiwan, although few believe that the dialogue that begins in January could serve to alter the strategic scenario. Today, Washington's main bet is not the KMT, the only one that has the capacity for dialogue with Beijing. The KMT has spent years trying to improve its traditional ties with the White House, but the disagreements in their respective policies (dialogue on one side, confrontation on the other) do not make it easy for them.

Xulio Ríos is Emeritus Advisor to the Chinese Policy Observatory.

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