Not everything is tight in Taiwan

XULIO RIOS

Lai Ching-te will assume the presidency of Taiwan on May 20. The change in leadership shows a double sign of continuity: from his party, the sovereigntist Minjindang or Democratic Progressive Party, at the head of the State, and also from the policy applied in the last eight years, during the mandate of Tsai Ing-wen. . However, there is one notable change: Lai will not be guaranteed the automatic referendum in Parliament after losing the absolute majority in the January 13 elections. The understanding of the unionist opposition (KMT, PPT), that it will not be automatic either and that they will have to work hard for it to bear fruit, threatens to greatly complicate his government action.

Mainland China will closely follow the policies of Lai, whom it considers a firm supporter of the island's independence, more radical in this than Tsai. However, caution can be expected in Lai's first gestures. Where we can expect greater decisiveness is in strengthening ties with the United States. Lai's vice president, Hsiao Bi-khim, is a guarantee of fluidity in this bilateral relationship that will advance at a determined pace in the commercial, technological and also defense fields.

In the weeks before the inauguration, Beijing is promoting gestures of detente that it has agreed with the opposition, specifically with the KMT, lifting trade bans, partially recovering tourism and, above all, building bridges with some sectors of society. Taiwanese, from military veterans to young people, to develop policies related to them. The province of Fujian, located opposite the island, has identified as its main task to consolidate itself as a pole of attraction, multiplying preferential policies towards Taiwan. China is equally likely to continue shrinking Taipei's international space.

These policies, generally softer or more nuanced, are based on the loss of the absolute majority of sovereignty that provides a greater margin of action, but they will not prevent the persistence of displays of military muscle as a warning or reaction to decisions interpreted as having a sovereignist sign. , especially in the field of security and defense, but also politically. There will be no direct dialogue between China and Lai.

Talks between the United States and China face a difficult obstacle to overcome in Taiwan. If the ultimate goal is to stabilise relations, as was indicated in Secretary of State Blinken's last visit to Beijing between 24 and 26 April, this is materially impossible without channelling this dispute through the adoption of de-escalation measures. They are also unlikely, and not only because of the election year in the United States, but because Democrats and Republicans share a resounding rejection of the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. Even Biden gave signs of abandoning Washington's traditional "strategic ambiguity" by assuring that he would defend Taiwan in the event of an attack by the Chinese military.

It should be remembered that Taiwan is strategically located, enclosing the Chinese People's Liberation Army within the first island chain, preventing it from posing a substantial threat to US military bases, currently in the process of reactivation and expansion. Since he came to power in 2021, the policy of US President Joe Biden's administration in Taiwan has prioritized the collective support of US allies and partners. This strategy, by the United States plus its allies, partners, and Taiwan, marks a shift from previous administrations that had treated Taiwan's security primarily as a bilateral issue. Whoever wins in November, it is to be hoped that Taiwan will be more present in the institutional initiatives led by the United States and will continue to twist this issue in China's face as long as it does not bow its head.

Therefore, they expect moments of change and turbulent waters in the next four years in the region. The priorities of both indicate a certain firmness in the framework of the Taiwan problem. However, the weakness of the Lai Government, which it will try to compensate with a more intense rapprochement with Washington, will be counterbalanced by the momentum of Beijing's rapprochement with the unionists. This framework will have the immediate consequence of accentuating the political division on the island.

Preventing the island's political agenda from being summed up in the triangle with the United States and mainland China should be a concern shared by Taiwanese parties and society. The question of Taipei's future status weighs on other issues that concern ordinary people. Days ago, for example, official statistics on the distribution of wealth in Taiwan highlighted that the richest 20% of the island's population has assets greater than 50 million TND (approximately $1.560 billion), while The poorest 20% only have 770.000 TND (approximately 24 thousand dollars), which represents a new historical record with a difference of 67 times. Not everything is tight in Taiwan.

Xulio Ríos is an emeritus advisor to the China Policy Observatory.