The two Taiwan elections

XULIO RIOS

Taiwan will hold local elections on November 26, known as
“nine in one”. Also a referendum on lowering the voting age (it is the
the only place in the world where the minimum age to exercise the right to vote is
20 years old). Two years from the next presidential elections in which Tsai
Ing-wen will not be able to attend again, the tendencies that these
elections can refine the political strategies of the main formations. Y
also from the continent and the USA. Therefore, there are several choices at stake.

The immediate key to the political future of the contentious Taiwanese takes us back to 2024. But
a victory for the Kuomintang (KMT) in the 26N elections would strengthen their options
facing that decisive electoral contest; a defeat, on the other hand, could accelerate
its wear. The same could be said of the ruling Minjindang or PDP (Party
Progressive Democrat). Within two years you will hardly be able to count on the help
of the Hong Kong crisis that in 2020 managed to lift the weak leadership of Tsai Ing-wen and
perhaps the current strategy of polarization with Beijing is not the most appropriate. The
27N, everyone will have to weigh their calculations.

Basically, supporting one or the other option, that of the KMT or the PDP, is also choosing between
the continuity of the tension with mainland China or the search for formulas of
I accommodate that they moderate it. The intensification of pressure from Beijing, especially in the
deployment format for air and naval missions of the EPL (People's Army of
Liberation) in the environment of the island, has been translated on numerous occasions into
electoral disaffection of the forces in favor of reunification. Nevertheless,
Paradoxically, the insistence of some sectors in the US that a war could
be closer than imagined, could influence the electorate in the opposite direction to the
intended.

Taiwanese pragmatism is well known. Taiwan is not Ukraine anymore
they find it hard to imagine an equivalent situation. The combination of an increase in
continental pressure on several fronts and the hypothetical exaggeration of the threat by
of the United States could lead to the feeling of the Taiwanese that the possibility
of a conflict is not remote but real, contrary to what was imagined until now.
Gesticulation on either side has usually been perceived as theatrical in the
to the extent that nobody seemed interested in crossing certain limits. Since the visit of
Nancy Pelosi, that changed. And the interpretations to the use of the political meaning of the XX
CPC Congress abound in the same thesis.

The electoral translation of this change in perception would imply disavowal of the
PDP strategy and advocate for the restoration of a bilateral dialogue, only possible
instances of the KMT, repairing the ties and exploring the bases of a coexistence
peace that removes the prospect of war, which the Taiwanese have not known for a long time
more than seventy years. Ukraine, yes, is very dissuasive in this regard.

The Taiwanese are aware that the US is using the island in its struggle with China.
Also that a crisis like the one in Ukraine would have devastating effects in Taiwan
given its territorial singularity and its high population density.
Beijing would not need the war to advance reunification, but could choose to
her in the medium term if the independence option takes hold beyond 2024. It can
expect more than the US, which urgently needs success in destabilization strategies
of China, who resist him in view of the failure of the commercial or technological wars.

But the sovereignist continuity in Taipei would seriously compromise the prospects
elections of their allies. A KMT defeat could definitively fracture the
party and collapse the “third cooperation” with the CCP.

If that were the case, conquering a Taiwan destroyed at the hands of the Chinese themselves would be a
unforgivable tragedy. It is plausible, however, that the continental authorities
advance in a strategy of encirclement of the island, raising the pressure on all
levels. The next two years will be especially intense in a risky game to
three bands in which the tone of the dialogue between the US and China in this regard will be
crucial.

A hypothetical change of course in the Taiwanese, local and other elections,
can overturn the region as a whole, thus disavowing one of the
The main US arguments for applying its policy of strategic encirclement to China.

Xulio Ríos is Emeritus Advisor to the Chinese Policy Observatory.

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