Xi and Taiwan: What's New at the XX CCPh Congress?

XULIO RIOS

Xi Jinping said little about Taiwan in his report – the short one – to the 20th CPC Congress. Perhaps the most outstanding thing has been the fact of making a single mention of the "1992 Consensus", abounding in everything else (barely 600 words) in the usual topics. The focus has, however, been placed on two variables: the use of force to solve the problem of reunification and the acceleration of the deadlines to achieve said objective.

It disappointed, without a doubt, those who expected an overwhelming dialectical forcefulness that would somehow match the display of muscle that the blockade of the island represented after Nancy Pelosi's visit. But the focus on Taiwan cannot be interpreted in isolation from the rest of the report. And what this, basically, comes to say, is that now it is, above all, home.

The US continues, wrong or wrong, that China is obsessed with breaking the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, although Washington is undoubtedly the most active since the Trump Administration in this regard. If the tension concerned him, he would lower his tone, although if he did he would have an added problem, that of justifying the increase in military and strategic pressure around the AUKUS, QUAD and other similar endeavours. The tactic is the same as always: first, they magnify the problem; later, they sell you the solution (preferably, in comfortable armament quotas).

In his speech, Xi has not announced any fundamental changes. Secretary of State A. Blinken is wrong when he asserts that "Taiwan has become the core of China's modernization"; on the contrary, it is still the B side. It is true that it is a substantial part of the rivalry between China and the US, but the path chosen to overcome it is to accelerate the progress and development of the continent based on innovation. A stronger China will be in a better position to accelerate that process and, above all, to ward off “interference from external forces”, at which Xi directed his sharpest darts.

Blinken reiterated in a Stanford colloquium with his predecessor Condoleeza Rice that the deadline "will be much faster than expected", a statement that only serves to tense the situation although, in truth, it is not based on anything new that suggests an alteration of another date that is still referential: 2049.

The insistence that there is a great danger that China will resort to the use of force in the next five years, with the horizon of 2027 (centennial of the People's Liberation Army), serves to justify US plans to sell Taiwan 6.500 billion of dollars in arms in the next few years (enshrined in the recently proposed Taiwan Policy Act). The Defense Ministry in Taiwan is proposing a 13,9 percent increase next year, which would equate to 2,4 percent of GDP and an increase of 0,2 percent from this year. On the other hand, the allusion to the economic cataclysm derived from a serious crisis should really worry us all and therefore the precise diplomatic means should be available to avoid this scenario. The EU, once again, has an excellent opportunity to develop its own discourse.

Xi's caution is explained in strategic but also tactical terms. In view of the upcoming Taiwanese local elections on November 26, a bellicose harangue would only benefit the pro-independence formations when the nationalists leave with good feelings. The KMT sent a message to the XX Congress calling for dialogue based on the “1992 Consensus”.

For the PCCh, the priority is peaceful reunification and this requires creating the political conditions to open a bilateral negotiation process “between Chinese”. And above all, it needs stability in the coming years to accelerate its modernization, convinced that its success will pave the way for Taiwan's recovery under a mutually accepted formula whose definition has not yet been produced. It is the real novelty that is still pending.

Xulio Riosis Emeritus Advisor to the Chinese Policy Observatory.